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Appointments to Final National Courts -

Lessons from Charles Darwin*
The Hon. Michael Kirby AC CMG"
This article argues in favour of encouraging variations in judicial appointments ,
based on the idea that differing views , stemming from differing values , amongst
members of the judiciary are natural , legitimate and in the interest of governmental

appointing authorities as well as the public . The author supports a democratic
process in the appointment of judges, which attracts public scrutiny of these
diverse values, and sees a distinct advantage in retaining a role of the elected

government in the appointment of judges. This link with the changing
composition of the legislature and government seems to be the best way to reflect

and cope with differing views held in society about the values judges must
invoke.
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I. The Darwinian Law of Variation
A final national court plays an important role in helping a society to

to the ever-changing environment in which law operates in a democracy

proposition is that, to be successful, such institutions must adapt to the l

variation. They must be able to reflect a variety of responses that will p
them to adapt to changing times and needs.

A hundred and fifty years ago Charles Darwin explained that all
organisms need adaptation and variation to survive and to adapt to new t
and circumstances. Reproduction by identical or near-identical cloning w

endanger the capacity of the organism to cope with contemporary challe

even perhaps to survive. This conclusion has a message for lawyers, legis
and citizens on how they should go about appointing judges to such impo

national institutions. Variety not sameness, is the message that Darwin's i

teaches. It is also the message that I propound.

The Australian Constitution of 1901 envisaged the High Court of Aust
as "a Federal Supreme Court" of Australia and as the principal repository

judicial power of the Commonwealth".1 However, detailed provisions
operation of the Court, and for the appointment of the Justices, were not

until 1903.2 Federal legislation3 later provided that the court would be a "s
court of record and consist of the Chief Justice and two [later six] other Justices" .4

In the appointment of new Justices, provision is now made for the F

Attorney-General, before any appointment of a Justice to a vacant office, to c

with the Attorneys-General of the States in Australia in relation t

appointment.5 This provision was not enacted until 1979. Although it has r

in the creation of a pool of governmental nominees, and was designed to

State criticisms of interpretations of the Constitution by the court inim

State powers, the process of "consultation" means just that. The States p

nominees. But there is no obligation for the Commonwealth to lim
appointments to those nominated, still less to accept any of the par
nominees. My own appointment in 1996 followed my nomination b
1 Constitution of Australia, 1900, § 71.

2 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
3 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth).
4 High Court oř Australia Act 1979 § 5.
5 Ibid., at 6.
18
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Attorney-General for New South Wales. I was then serving as President of the
Court of Appeal of that State. But not all Justices in recent years were nominated

by a State government Linder this statutory procedure.

II. The Importance of Judicial Values
Because of similarities between provisions in the constitutions of Australia
and the United States of America, the original Justices of the High Court of Australia

commonly followed American constitutional doctrines on federal questions,
including doctrines on inter-governmental immunities and so-called reserved
State powers.6 In effect, the Justices concluded, from a reading of the Constitution
as a whole, that it was intended to preserve and maintain a kind of federal balance

between central and sub-national powers.
The personal harmony of the original Justices of the High Court of Australia

over fundamentals is evident from the fact that they lunched together daily and

formed a strong social and professional bond with each other. However, in 1906,

the appointment of two additional Justices, each a fine lawyer with less
conservative legal views, shattered the calm of the new Australian court. As
former Chief Justice Mason, explained: " With the advent of Isaacs and Higgins, [Chief

Justice] Grijfith's dominating influence began its steady decline. The days of friendly
concurrences were a thing of the past/'7

If ever it was necessary to demonstrate to legal readers the importance of

judicial appointments for the values of a final national court, that lesson was
quickly drawn to notice in Australia when Justice Isaacs and Justice Higgins took
their seats. Isaacs, in particular, was no less brilliant than Griffith and even more

ambitious. He had a great mastery of the law. And he differed fundamentally in
his approach to the construction of the Australian Constitution.

With the support of Higgins, Isaacs began propounding a constitutional
doctrine that would eventually prevail in 1920 in the Engineers Case.8 According
to this doctrine, if a relevant legislative power was granted by the Constitution

6 This doctrine was derived from McCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 17 US 316. See ,
Deakin v. Webb, (1904) 1 CLR 585; Baxter v. Commissioners of Taxation, (NSW)
(1907) 4 CLR 1087.

7 A.F. Mason, The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia 31 1 (T. Blackshield,
M. Coper and G. Williams eds., 2001).

8 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd., (1920) 28 CLR
129.
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to the Federal Parliament, the words of the grant were to be give

and full ordinary meaning. The paramountcy of the federal law w

This rule of constitutional literalism continues to prevail in
'reserved State powers' doctrine was overthrown.

It is vital to appreciate that neither the position of the original Ju

High Court of Australia nor that of Justices Isaacs and Higgins w
illicit, improper, wrongly motivated or impermissibly "activist"
is, a legitimate and fully arguable legal approach to the judicial tas
has had highly intelligent and honest supporters in and outside th
Each reflects a different spectrum of values and perceptions abou

objectives of the Constitution. Each was, and is, sincerely held b
independent judges.

However, because these values have profound consequenc

outcomes of cases (not to say for the distribution of governmenta

a federal nation), the appointment of judges having such differi
legitimate interest to the governmental appointing authorities an
of the nation who will be affected by the decisions made by such

III. The Creativity of Courts in Common
Law Countries

The books on the shelves of judicial chambers demonstrate the fact that

centuries of judicial creativity had preceded the appointments of all of the pres

judicial incumbents in Britain, Australia, India and other countries of the comm
law. Where else did the common law come from, if not from judicial predecesso

To deny the creative element in the judicial function, in such a pragmatic an
effective legal system, was impossible in the face of daily and historical realit
Perhaps this very creativity has obliged a kind of fiction, or sleight-of-hand,

to settle the fears of a democratic people that unelected judges might enjoy t

much power. Yet creative power they certainly enjoy - not only in the exposit
(or "declaration") of the common law, but also in the elaboration of ambigui

in legislation. Some of that legislation, over the centuries, certainly counts

'constitutional' in character. It may not, in every country, be in a sin
comprehensive document. But it exists.

In the exposition of the common law, there are many familiar instances of th

creative role that now devolves on the new Supreme Court of the United Kingd
20
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Take as an example the string of decisions in the English courts on the so-called
"wrongful birth" cases,9 culminating in that of the House of Lords in McFarlane . 10 To

a very large extent, the problem presented to the courts was itself an outcome of the

application of new medical technology. Lawyers might pretend that rulings in
individual cases followed logically and inevitably from earlier decisional authority.

However, no one could seriously suggest that the outcomes were exclusively a
technical or purely verbal exercise for which a lifetime's experience in commercial

or insolvency law was the best preparation for a high judicial decision-maker. In
Cattanach,n a majority of the High Court of Australia12 held that a doctor could be

legally liable for a birth, because of negligence, of a healthy but unplanned and
unwanted child. This is the opposite of decisions reached elsewhere.

Even sharper have been the divisions between judges addressing medical
professional liability in the so-called "wrongful life" cases.13 The majority of the

High Court of Australia rejected the existence of a cause of action brought by a

child profoundly injured by blindness, deafness and mental retardation,
occasioned by a repeatedly undiagnosed condition of foetal rubella.14 The majority

of the Court denied recovery on the doctrinal footing that it was not logically
possible for it to be asserted, on behalf of the child, that the child should not have

been born at all. Adapting the words of Professor Peter Cane, my own view was
that "the plaintiff [...] is surely not complaining that he was born , simpliciter, but that
because of the circumstances under which he was born his lot in life is a disadvantaged one" J5

In the United Kingdom, the Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976

(UK) expressly prohibited "wrongful life" actions.16 That Act had been drafted

following recommendations of the English Law Commission.17 The Act also
9 Thake v. Maurice, [1986J QB 644 (CA), leave to appeal to the House of Lords

refused. See also, Gold v. Harigney Health Authority, [1988] QB 481, at 484; Allen v.
Bloomsbury Health Authority, [1993] 1 All ER 651, at 662.

10 McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board, [2000] 2 AC 59.
11 Cattanach v. Melchior, (2003) 215 CLR 1.

12 McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ; Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ
dissenting.

13 Harriton v Stephens, (2006) 226 CLR 52.
14 Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; Kirby J dissenting.
15 P. Cane, Injuries to Unborn Children 51 Aust. L. J. 704, 719 (1977). See, Harriton v.
Stephens, (2006) 226 CLR 52, at 59 [110].
16 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act, 1976 (UK), § l(2)(b).
1 7 Law Commission of England and Wales, Report on Injuries to Unborn Children (La wCom

No. 60, 1974), Cmnd 5709, pp. 45-54.
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reflected the thinking of the English Court of Appeal in the superven

McKay.™ In other common law jurisdictions, the preponderance of de

has followed roughly the same analysis as that of the majority in the H

of Australia, although not without occasional contrary views.19 So fa
basic principles of tort law are concerned (and the evaluation of issu

by relevant considerations of legal principle and legal policy),20 resp
remain unconvinced. But this is beside my present point. The cases s
differing views can legitimately exist, and do exist, amongst honest a

experienced judges. And such differences arise because the judg
different values.

Useful insights can often be derived from judicial reasoning in other
countries. However, in the end, a final national court must reach its own

conclusions on subjects involving the content of its domestic common law. It
must do so by reference not only to legal authority (which will not formally bind

the final court to a conclusion); but also by reference to considerations of legal
principle and policy. These considerations enliven an evaluative exercise. This is
stronger and more convincing if it is transparent in its performance.

IV. Judicial Values and Statutory Interpretation
Apart from the common law, judicial values can also influence the outcome
in contested cases of statutory interpretation. There could be few clearer illustrations
of this proposition than in the divided decision of the House of Lords in Fitzpatrick .21

There, the majority held that a person was capable of being a member of the
"family" of his same-sex partner, for the purposes of the Rent Act 1977 (UK). The
decision was reached over a strong dissenting decision that laid emphasis upon
the history of the Rent Act and how it would have been understood at the time

of the original enactment of the applicable provisions (and still more the
provisions upon which these were based, dating back to the early decades of
the 20th century).

A clash was thus presented in Fitzpatrick between a value that insisted on a
literal interpretation of the words of the legislation as Parliament "intended"
18 McKay v. Essex Area Health Authority, [1982] 1 QB 1166.
19 See, Harriton v Stephens, (2006) 226 CLR 52, at 70 [1153-73].
20 See, Harriton v Stephens, (2006) 226 CLR 52, at 86 [1110].
21 Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd., [2001] 1 AC 27, at 34. See, A. Lester
et al, Human Rights Law & Practice 401 (3rd edn., 2009).
22
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those words to apply when they became law, and the value of reading such
statutory words so that they would apply in the contemporaneous social
circumstances. There, by virtue of other legislation and human rights provisions,

discriminatory and unequal interpretations of the law, contrary to the rights
and interests of minorities, have generally been discouraged and avoided.
If ever there was a clash of legal values and of contestable principles over
the approach to generally beneficial legislation, it can therefore be seen in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Fitzpatrick. It is not necessary to dig into the

psychological well-springs of the respective Law Lords. Nor is it appropriate to
evaluate their respective life journeys, religious upbringing or perceptions about
human rights. However, enough has been shown to indicate that the task of
statutory interpretation, like that of 'declaring' the common law, is not mechanical.

It cannot be performed (at least in a final national court) with no aids other than

past cases and a dictionary or two. Clearly, individual judicial values affect
outcomes in such cases. That is why judicial appointments are extremely
important. This is particularly so in appointments to final national courts.
Increasingly, in the coming years (including in the United Kingdom, Australia

and India) this truth will come to be realised. It will be realised, for example, by

the appointing officers in the executive governments who, under our
constitutional arrangements, sometimes influence judicial appointments. But it
will also affect the process of consultation and selection that is undertaken for the

making of such appointments.

V. Old and Reformed Procedures of Judicial
Appointment
Under the traditional British model for the appointment of superior court
judges, including those of final courts, the last word conventionally belonged to
the executive government, elected to reflect the majority of the members in the

lower house of Parliament. Some (including in the judiciary and legal profession)
have found this a defective, even dangerous, arrangement. The critics fear purely
political appointees. On the other hand, there remain strong arguments in support
both of the theory and practice that lies behind the appointment of judges by

persons elected by the people.
The provision for a democratic component to be included in the appointment

of judges, with their law-making role, has a doctrinal and political, as well as an

historical, justification. Such appointments provide a constitutional symmetry
23
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to the power typically assigned to parliaments operating thr

Commonwealth of Nations, to remove superior court judges on th

proved incapacity or misconduct.22 Both the appointment and rem

are obviously constitutionally important steps. They are comparat

and at once personal and public, having significance for the go
democratic polity.

Combined with the strong tradition of apoliticism to be observ

the coming in and going out of the judges, the foregoing arrangem
said to have worked rather well, on the whole, over a very long tim

recognised constitutional realities. They have assured a democr

political role in the appointment of judges. But when the practical s

judicial values is understood, that political element has, in m

justified. At least in Australia, it has tended to ensure a measure of

the values of those appointed over time to high judicial office. It

public scrutiny of judicial appointments in the media, academic and

discourse. It has also provided a corrective to an exclusively "

judgment on appointments by calling attention to considerations
term deployment of individual decisional values, not just technica
or linguistic skills.

In common law countries, the chief radical alternatives to this B

have evolved in the United States of America. In that country, mo

are either elected to office or are subject to electoral confirmation or r

involves a far more active democratic participation in the sele

Switzerland is the only major country other than the United Stat

procedures for judicial election. Few legal observers in Commonwea

would favour such a process. It subjects candidates to direct press
be inconsistent with the independent and impartial performance o
functions. Those features represent the hallmarks of a judiciary co
modern standards of universal human rights.23

The somewhat less radical provisions of the United St

Constitution introduced an overt democratic element in the ap

federal judges. They do this by the constitutional requirement that

22 See, e.g. Constitution of Australia, 1900, § 72; Constitution of India, 1

23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arts. 10-11, Internation

Civil & Political Rights, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 14; European Convention

Rights, Art. 6.1 ("Right to a fair triar7). See, Lester et al, supra note 21,
24
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must be nominated by the President but appointed "with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate".24 The Senate is itself advised on such confirmations by its powerful

Judiciary Committee. At least in recent times, a great logjam has arisen, delaying

the appointment of federal judges in a way that was clearly not envisaged by
those who drafted the constitutional article.25

To Commonwealth eyes, this is only one of the defects of the United States'
provision. Whilst recognising the high importance of the appointees and of their

values for the discharge of their offices, the American confirmation procedure
has tended to subject candidates to questions that lie at the heart of their future

judicial performance. It has subjected them to political pressure to participate in

'coaching' by representatives of the President, with a resulting potential to
diminish the judicial office by needlessly involving its members, or potential
members, in controversies defined by political and partisan perspectives.26

VI. The Modern Australian Appointment

of Judges
In Australia, the procedures for judicial appointment have not, so far,
formally challenged the ultimate repository of the appointment power. It belongs,

in the conventional British way, to the executive government of the
Commonwealth or the States or Territories concerned. Nevertheless, in a

comparatively short time, procedures for advertising judicial vacancies and
inviting applications and nominations have spread from the lower courts (where

they began) to some superior courts, including State Supreme Courts and the
Federal Court of Australia. As well, the present Federal Attorney-General in

Australia has created a non-statutory committee to advise him on such
appointments. The committee comprises three present or former judges (former
Chief Justice F.G. Brennan of the High Court; Chief Justice M.E. Black of the Federal
Court; Justice Jane Mathews, formerly of the Federal and Supreme Courts) and an
official from the federal Attorney-General's Department. The committee's reports,

which are confidential, are advisory only.
As stated, in the case of the High Court of Australia, legislation requires a
non-binding consultation to take place with the Attorneys-General of the States
24 U.S. Const., Art. II.

25 Washington Post, October 16, 2009, pp. Al, A20.
26 See, L. Eisgruver, The Next Justice: Repairing the Supreme Court Appointments Process
(2007).
25
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of Australia. However, the actual appointment is reserved, under th
Constitution, to the Federal Executive Council, which advises the

General. That Council comprises, relevantly, politicians who are me

federal cabinet. In effect, because of the recognised legal, constitutional

significance of appointees to the operations of the final national court i

the ultimate decision is made by the federal cabinet. That body h

recommendation from the Attorney-General. However, acco

substantiated reports in Australia, many a name has gone into cab

support of the Minister. Yet if the proposed appointee does not hav

of the Prime Minister and that of senior Ministers, the name is unlikel

to appointment.

VII. New Procedures in the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, a changed selection procedure for the new Suprem

Court is established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK). It involves

panel of five persons, chaired by the President of the Supreme Court. The pa

also includes the Deputy President of the Supreme Court and three other members

each nominated by the respective judicial appóintments bodies of England a
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. These latter nominees need not be jud

or even lawyers.27 However some or all typically are judges. The select
procedure has been described in the media as "convoluted". Clearly, it

dominated, if not formally controlled, by presently serving judges. Contrary

previous practice, the President of the Supreme Court even has a role to play
the selection of his or her successor.

Only one of the initial twelve Supreme Court Justices in the United Kingdom

(Baroness Hale of Richmond) is a woman. All but one (Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore)

have a background that includes a degree from either Oxford or Cambridge
University. From time to time, there have been similar comments in Australia
about the comparative lack of diversity in the professional education, background
and practice, of most of the nation's final court judges. As in Canada, however, the

gender imbalance of the final court in Australia is much less visible (In Australia
3 of 7 are women, in Canada 4 of 9, including the Chief Justice.In New Zealand,
the Chief Justice is a woman, Dame Sian Elias). Of course, most members of the
first Bench of the new Supreme Court are chosen from the outgoing members of
the House of Lords.

27 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK), §§ 26 - 28.
26

This content downloaded from
13.234.96.8 on Fri, 14 Oct 2022 20:08:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Appointments to Final National Courts - Lessons from Charles Darwin

From the foregoing considerations concerning the importance of values
(involving the ascertainment of relevant legal authority, legal principle and legal

policy) in final national courts of appeal, I would suggest that a number of
conclusions follow.

VIII. New Developments in India

But what of the position of judicial appointments in India? Unde

Government of India Act 1919 (UK), the appointments of judges of the High C

were, in accordance with the long-standing British tradition, in the abs
discretion of the Crown. Following the passage of the Government of Ind

1935 (UK), the appointment of judges of the Federal Court of India and
High Courts was also taken to be in the absolute discretion of the Cr

There were no express provisions for "consultations" with the Chief Ju

about the appointment process. Doubtless (as a matter of courte

convention), the Government of India would, in many or most case

consulted, and taken into account, the opinions of the relevant Chief Ju

but not so as to be bound by such opinions. The adoption of the Constitut

India, after independence and with effect from 26 January 1950,

significantly new provisions introduced to add a degree of formality to

judicial appointments process.

The contemplation of regular turnover in the highest courts was mad

by the provision, in the case of the Supreme Court, of a retirement age

years.30 The provision for the mode of appointment, provided by the Constitu

was stated in Art. 124(2) as follows:
Every judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the President

by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of
the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States

as the President may deem necessary for the purpose.
Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the
Chief Justice, the Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.

28 A.P. Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India Vol. 1, 769 (2nd edn., 200

29 D.D. Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India 19 (19th edn., 2003

Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 14 November
when it was read for the third time and received the signature of the Presid
the Assembly.
30 Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 124(2).
27
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Against the background of these words and the long traditio
observed in the United Kingdom and India, it was commonly bel
prior to 1993 that the obligation of "consultation", referred to in

connoted discussion and serious consideration but not the
concurrence. This was the view expressed by Justice Pathak for

Court in the First Judges Case.31 Nevertheless, after the 1980s, this in
came to be doubted.

The reasons for the doubts were based, partly, on verbal analysis of the
constitutional text; but partly on a reflection concerning the perceived intrusions
of the Executive with political motives rather than "selection of the best possible

candidates". The supersession of judges; their apparent punishment for decisions
adverse to the government; and the " weapon to transfď' to " break the back of independent

High Court judges during the Emergency of 1975-1977" led to much closer scrutiny in

India of the constitutional appointments process.32
In 1991, an application was made to the Supreme Court, asking the court to
review the correctness of the majority approach, as expressed in the First Judges

Case. This application came before a three-judge bench which considered that it
should be decided by a court of larger composition.33 The Second Judges Case was

thus heard by a court of nine judges, assembled to respond to the question,
relevantly, whether, in the appointment of judges, the position of the Chief Justice

of India was to hold primacy.34

In the Second Judges Case,35 the Supreme Court backed down from the
recognition of the primacy or "absolute discretion" of the government that had
been upheld in the First Judges Case. It emphasised the historical shift that had

occurred by the express introduction in 1950 of a new process of specified
"consultation"; the obligatory character of that "consultation", binding on the
Executive; the imperative language used in Art. 124(2) ("shall always be consulted ");

the absence of similar obligations of consultation for other appointments made
by the Executive under the Constitution; and the mandatory provision for the
31 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 (Supreme Court of India) [1*1 88, 997,
1001, 1013-1015, 1026] per Venka taramaiah J.
32 Basu, supra note 29, at 764.

33 Subhash Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 631 (Supreme Court of India).

34 S. Vaidyanathan, Consitrjtionausm, Human Rights and the Rule of Law 192 (M.C. Sharma
and R. Ramachandran eds., 2005).

35 Supreme Court Advoca tes-On-Record Association v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC
268 (Supreme Court of India).
28
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participation of the Chief Justice of India alone. From these provisions, the
majority in the Second Judges Case concluded that the "consultation" referred to
was intended to be effected in accordance with the conditions that had called
for it to happen.36

Thereafter, it was apparently expected that the Chief Justice of India would
speak as the " voice of the institution representing the collective wisdom of the judges in the

highest court"?7 However, this expectation was reportedly breached in 1998. It
was at this point that Soli Sorabjee, by then Attorney-General for India, proposed
a further Presidential reference to the Supreme Court on the matter, to clear the

air. His intervention was described as "statesmanly".38 The government was not
seeking a reconsideration of the entire decision in the Second Judge's Case. It was
made clear that the Union of India would accept, as binding, the decision of the

Supreme Court in the Third Judges Case of 1998.39 The judicial opinion on this

occasion was procured in accordance with a power granted to the President of
India to consult the Supreme Court and to obtain an advisory opinion on a matter
of public importance.40

The Supreme Court laid down a detailed protocol which it felt able to spell
out of the comparatively sparse instructions of Art. 124 of the Constitution. The
primacy of the Chief Justice of India was reinforced, although it was held that he

ought to consult four of the most senior puisne judges of the Supreme Court, in

place of the two next most senior judges as had previously been the relevant
collegium. A duty to secure the written opinion of the most senior Supreme Court

judge from the High Court of the State, from which the person recommended
came, was also added. Certain exceptions were allowed to the observance of a

general rule of seniority amongst High Court judges by reference to special
considerations of "outstanding merit" and also geography.41
Mr. Vaidyanathan has remarked that the revised procedure laid down in
the Third Judge's Case, involved a "distinct improvement" over the past. However,
he suggested that there was room for still further improvement. He foreshadowed

36 Citing Port Louis Corporation v. Attorney-General, [1965] AC 1111 (PC), 1112 per
Lord Morris.

37 Vaidyanathan, 164.
38 Loc cit.

39 In Re President's Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1 (Supreme Court of India).
40 Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 143.
41 Vaidyanathan, 194-195.
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the creation of a new national judicial commission for the appoi
transfer of members of the higher judiciary, under an amendm

Constitution that it was suggested should follow the enquiry in wh
Advocate Soli Sorabjee took part.42

An outsider, such as I, has to be hesitant in criticising cons

developments in another country. However, the foregoing saga has h

critics in India. Their criticisms, which seem persuasive to this wri
attention to the great distance that has been travelled from the ve
express requirement of "consultation", for which the Indian Consti

expressly provides. Since Dr. Johnson's first Dictionary of the English La

verb "to consult" in the English language had ordinarily been c

involving no more than "to deliberate in common".43 It involves secu

and conjoint deliberation. To turn "consultation" into "concurrence"

more still, to impose a detailed series of pre-conditions, seems on i

alteration of the meaning of the constitutional text unwarranted by

and purpose.
This is to say no more than was said by Justice Bhagwati in the First Judges
Case:44

... [While] giving the fullest meaning and effect to 'consultation', it
must be borne in mind that it is only consultation which is provided

by way of fetter upon the power of appointment vested in the
Central Government and consultation cannot be equated with
concurrence ... [The] Central Government is not bound to act in
accordance with [the proffered] opinion.
Clearly, conventions should be developed to ensure that the finest talent
[is] recruited to the Judicial Service. However, as Justice Venkataramaiah remarked

in the First Judges Case, the provision for the appointment of the judges by the

Executive, after consultation, has had the beneficial consequence of according
them an appropriate measure of democratic legitimacy. This is indicated by the
sanction of the people of India, whom the Council of Ministers represent. In that
way only, the Judges may be called People's Judges. If the appointment of judges

42 India, National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution. See also,
Indian Law Commission, 121st report (1987).
43 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, (1 755, London) (Reprint, Times
Books Ltd., London, 1979).
44 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149, 199-200 (Supreme Court of India).
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is to be made on the basis of the recommendation of judges only then they will be

Judges' Judges, and such appointments may not fit into the scheme of popular
democracy.

Although one commentator has expressed the view that this remark was
"so astonishing that no farther comment is necessary ",45 it is not remarkable to me to

draw inferences from the overall design of a constitution that is both republican

and democratic in its basic character. This has been done many times in India
itself. Whilst there may have been past occasions of misuse of the political power
for the appointment of judges, the great strength of the judiciary of India was
first won and recognised during a time when the judges were appointed by the
power of the Executive alone. That appointing power was itself derived from the
people of India and not done by the say-so of fellow judges.
The democratic feature of the Union of India is probably its proudest boast
in the world today. Once appointed, the judges of the final and superior courts

are completely divorced from party politics. But the moment of appointment
involves a properly guarded democratic act. It is one which, in my most respectful

view, judges should not erase by self-empowering decisions.
I take this to be the thinking behind the remark of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer,46

a great judge of the Supreme Court of India, appointed under the old protocol,
" The [in-house process of appointment] has often been dilatory, arbitrary , and smeared
by favourites. ... The Nine Judges Bench , in a mighty seizure of power, wrested authority to

appoint ... judges from the top Executive to themselves by a stroke of adjudicatory selfenthronement" : 47

It may be a natural and understandable desire on the part of many judges
and lawyers to wish to protect the Bench from unqualified political favourites
and incompetents. However, on the whole, judges tend to be older, wealthier and
more set in their ways than the members of the elected Executive. The work they
do involves giving effect to important values, as the three successive Judges' Cases

themselves clearly illustrate. Within the legal profession, judges and lawyers
have been known occasionally to play favourites. They may not do so for monetary

corruption: simply a preference for people who think the way they themselves

45 A.P. Datar, Commentary on the Constitution of India Vol. 1 766. (2nd edn., 2007).

46 V.R. Krishna Iyer, Constitutional Miscellany 278 (2nd edn., 2003).
47 Citing from V. Venkatesan, Judiciary: A Flawed Mechanism, Frontline, Vol.20, Issue
11,2003.

31

This content downloaded from
13.234.96.8 on Fri, 14 Oct 2022 20:08:49 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Vol. 22(1) National Law School oflndiaReview 2010

do and share their values. A great strength of the judiciary of I

robust independent-mindedness of the judges appointed under

There are perils in attempting to alter the infusion of an extern

palliate the conservatising forces of internal institutional opinio

IX. Some Conclusions

I now state a few conclusions that I derive from the foregoing analysis.

First , judges in final national courts, even more than trial judges and ju

in intermediate courts, have very large responsibilities: for the interpretatio

constitutional and equivalent provisions; for the construction of importan

ambiguous legislation; and for the ascertainment and 'declaration' of the com
law.

Secondly , the performance of the foregoing tasks, particularly at the level of a
final national court, is rarely a purely technical or mechanical exercise. It is highly

desirable that judges of such courts should be conscious, and transparent, about
their own values and processes of reasoning.
Thirdly , an appreciation of these features of judicial reasoning, especially in

a final national court, will have a number of practical consequences for the
organisation of the court and for the performance of its functions, including the

provision of the facility of intervention and advocacy by the parties. These will

be addressed not simply to past decisional authority but also to the broader
considerations of legal principle and policy that will typically be presented by an

appeal.48
Fourthly , for the tasks that are committed to final national courts, a range of

professional and personal skills on the part of the judges appointed to serve is
essential. Once the foregoing is acknowledged, there is wisdom in retaining a
distinct role for the elected government in the appointment of judges, especially
judges of appellate, and particularly judges of a final national court. With popular

accountability for such appointments in a representative democracy, it is
desirable (if not essential) to have more than a purely nominal or informal or
restricted link to the elected government and legislature.
48 Povey v. Qantas Airways Ltd., (2005) 223 CLR 189, applying Air France v. Saks,
(1985) 470 US 392 and considering Sidhu v. British Airways PLC, [1997] AC 430
(concerning the meaning of "accident" in Art. 17 of the Warsaw Convention on
Civil Aviation in its application to deep venous thrombosis).
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The input of governments that change over time, and which are accountable

to legislature, into the appointment of such judges, not only affords democratic
legitimacy for the appointees, reflecting arguably the most precious feature of the

national constitution. It also tends to secure, over time, reflections of the variety

of changing values that are also found in the changing composition of the
legislature and governments and in the community itself. This is not to politicise

the judiciary along purely partisan lines. It is simply to acknowledge the reality
that strongly differing views are often held in society about the kind of value

judgments that such judges must necessarily invoke and apply.
No one suggests the adoption in Australia, the United Kingdom, India or
other Commonwealth countries, of elections of judges or political confirmation
processes of the American variety. To our eyes, such procedures have too many
faults. By the same token, the effective assignment of (most) judicial appointments

to advisory bodies, operating wholly or substantially within an established legal
culture, is equally defective. Without disrespect to the very distinguished present

and past judges and other officials participating in such procedures, theirs are
not the only voices that should be heard in the making of such important public

appointments.
To replace judicial appointment by elected politicians effectively by a system

of judicial appointments selected by present or past judges severs the important
link of the judges to democratic authority for their offices. In the process, it risks
the effective imposition of an overly narrow perspective about what really matters

in judicial performance. It runs the particular risk of limiting the inputs of
information and assessment concerning the very wide range of values and qualities

that are essential to the judges of a final national court, immediately upon their
appointment.

These conclusions do not require a wholesale return to the former
appointments system whereby persons were exclusively appointed in a
mysterious and secret process undertaken by politicians advised by their
Departments, judges, and other officials. The introduction of opportunities for
nomination of, and application by, candidates for high judicial office is desirable.

So may be a facility for some kind of appropriate and proper official interview

process. Nevertheless, the danger of a purely judicial dominance of the
appointments of future judges is obvious. The risk in such a procedure is that
there may be insufficient questioning of the values of the judicial candidates,
their backgrounds and experience, and an excessively deferential attitude to the
established professional values and culture. That danger is far greater, in my
33
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view, than the supposed danger of political appointments, given
democratic inhibitions upon the appointing authorities to avoid
that ground.

The wisdom of the politicians may be that politicians (more tha

judges) will be more aware of the need for observance of the laws of
which Charles Darwin wrote so long ago. All living creatures and their

thrive best where they exhibit diversity.49 Inescapably, law and judgi

laden activities. The appointment process for the judiciary, and parti
final court, should properly reflect this reality.

The preferable appointment process, and the one that Darwin w

favoured, would involve the judges and other legal groups bein

consulted and their views considered. But the last word would belon

ministers, answerable to the electors. And this, I suggest, is what the

of India actually provides. Just as the decision of the Supreme Court
Judges Case originally declared.

49 See , C. Sunstf.in, Why Societies Need Dissent (2006).
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